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GROUND WATER. LOUISIANA'S QUASI-FICTIONAL AND
TRULY FUGACIOUS MINERAL*
Ground water may be defined as fresh water situated beneath the land
but within 2500 feet of the surface; it is a natural resource very often
taken for granted. Approximately one half of the population of the United
States depends upon ground water for its domestic water supply,' but
despite seeming abundance-an estimated thirty-three to fifty-nine
quadrillion gallons of fresh water are beneath the land area of the United
States within 2500 feet of the surface 2-our ground water resources are
threatened by unrestrained uses of the resource.
Ground water resources frequently must be considered nonrenewable
due to time factors and the physical changes often caused by overuse.
An aquifer3 can be depleted in less than a lifetime, but may take so long
to recharge that the depletion is functionally permanent.' In addition,
excessive withdrawals can cause underground water-bearing formations to
compact and lose their ability to store and yield water I Heavy pumping
in coastal areas causes salt water contamination of aquifers, 6 destroying
them as resources.
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* This publication was sponsored in part by the Louisiana Sea Grant College Pro-
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College and Atmospheric Administration, United States Department of Commerce. The federal
government is authorized to produce and distribute reprints for governmental purposes.
1. THE CONSERVATION FOUNDATION, STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENT, 1982, at 107 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENT] (citing COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALrrY-1980, at 230 (U.S. Gov't Printing Office 1980)).
2. Id. (citing U.S. WATER RESOURCES COUNCIL, SECOND NATIONAL WATER ASSESSMENT,
THE NATION'S WATER RESOURCES, 1975-2000, at 20 (U.S. Gov't Printing Office 1978)). The
200 to 300 years' supply estimate applies even if no recharge to aquifers, see infra note
3, occurs. Id. Of the 33-59 quadrillion gallons of water, present technology would allow
use of just one-fourth. Id.
3. An aquifer is a subterranean geologic formation which stores water and yields it
to wells. R. KAZMANN, MODERN HYDROLOGY 137 (1965). Aquifers can provide either salt
or fresh water; this note deals solely with fresh water aquifers.
4. Some large aquifers in the United States recharge so slowly that they may be con-
sidered nonrenewable on a human time scale. The dry High Plains region of Texas gets
most of its usable ground water from the Ogallala Formation. The aquifer has been heavily
pumped since the 1930's. By 1962, some High Plains counties had pumped out 30 to 44%
of the water originally stored beneath their soil. Pumping in the region exceeds recharge
so much that "in this instance the ground-water deposit must be considered exhaustible."
R. KAZMANN, supra note 3, at 181.
5. Excessive pumping can cause land subsidence when the deposits making up an aquifer
become compacted after the water between them is removed. Land elevation can be reduced
by as much as ten feet in this manner. Subsidence also reduces or destroys the ability of
an aquifer to transmit water once the water holding structure is destroyed. Id. at 195; see
also Lukas, When the Well Runs Dry: A Proposal for Change in the Common Law of
Ground Water Rights in Massachusetts, 10 B. C. ENVTL. AFF L. REV 445, 456-57 (1982).
6. R. KAZMANN, supra note 3, at 183. Underground formations infiltrated by salt water
are permanently useless as water resources. See STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note
1, at 107
7 R. KAZMANN, supra note 3, at 177
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Ground Water- A Neglected Louisiana Resource
Louisiana's law with respect to ground water has not developed with
the concerns of conservation and regulation of use as guiding principles.
Present law will not prevent one landowner from totally depriving his
neighbors of a share of the water which lies below all in a shared aquifer
Liability may be based only on negligence or deliberately harmful con-
duct; neither the types of competing uses involved nor precedence of use
are considered.8 Furthermore, nothing prevents such a landowner or lessee
from entirely depleting the water-bearing structure or formation. Loui-
siana's legal framework as to ground water has been accurately
characterized as "the rule of the biggest pump." 9 It should be revised
so that both ground water resources and the users of those resources will
receive optimum benefits and protection. This note will discuss the
background and development of our current water law and will outline
some suggested modifications.
Technical Definition and Legal Classification of Ground Water
Ground water may be defined as potable (drinkable) water found in
a bed of sediment porous and permeable enough to allow movement of
the water to supply wells, springs, lakes, and streams.'" This definition
of ground water recognizes its role in the hydrologic cycle and its character
as a resource.
Water from rainfall is the source of nearly all usable ground water
supplies. Rain strikes the earth and percolates downward. ' It normally
passes through an unsaturated zone where a portion of it is retained. Water
in the unsaturated zone is called soil water 2 Part of the water continues
to percolate downward until it reaches a zone of saturation in which all
open pores in the earth are full of water '1 Water in the zone of satura-
tion is ground water, and the upper limit of the zone of saturation is
the water table.'
8. Adams v Grigsby, 152 So. 2d 619 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963), writ refused, 244 La.
662, 153 So. 2d 880 (1963). For further discussion of Adams, see infra text accompanying
notes 35-59.
9. Coogan, Problems of Groundwater Rights in Ohio, 9 AKRON L. REV 34, 65 (1975).
10. Technically ground water "includes all of the waters found beneath the surface
of the ground." R. KAZMANN, supra note 3, at 129.
11. Foley, Water and the Laws of Nature, 5 KAN. L. REv 492, 495 (1957). Percola-
tion is a hydrologic term for seepage. Although water from rain-meteoric water-is the
primary kind of ground water, hydrologists have recognized two additional classes of subter-
ranean water. Juvenile water is water trapped deep beneath the earth long ago; it has been
termed "original" water and is insignificant in the water supply. Connate water is trapped
with sediments at the time of their deposition. It is difficult to identify and is likely to
be high in salts. Id.
12. Id. at 495-96.
13. See R. KAZMANN, supra note 3, at 132.
14. Foley, supra note 11, at 496.
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When this percolating water reaches the zone of saturation, it begins
to move slowly towards points of discharge at the surface.'" The move-
ment of ground water is gravity-controlled and therefore is down slope.' 6
Discharge occurs at points where the water table intersects the surface.
Examples of such points include stream valleys and springs.' 7
The terms "ground water" and "surface water" both apply to a single,
indivisible resource-the fresh water supply These terms simply describe
this water at different points in the hydrologic cycle. In this cycle, water
falls as liquid from the atmosphere to the land. It runs along or soaks
into the ground before it returns to the atmosphere by evaporation and
transpiration." This simple cycle has been eloquently described by a
hydrologist for the United States Geological Survey-
Water is like a living thing. Essentially all of it that is usable
is in motion-a part of the vast circulatory system known as the
hydrologic cycle. In this cycle water evaporates wherever it is
exposed to the air, but especially from the oceans; rises into the
atmosphere; travels as a part of vast air masses over ocean and
land; is condensed when an air mass rises to pass over another
or over a mountain range; and falls as rain or snow
[Water] may be surface water one moment and ground water
the next, and vice versa. But it is all water, and it must be con-
sidered as a whole-each phase in relation to the others and to
the entire hydrologic cycle."
The assertion that the interrelationship of water resources must be
recognized and considered has long been echoed by legal commentators.2"
Unfortunately, however, the legal classification of ground water dates from
a time when lack of knowledge about the resource forced courts to make
15. See generally R. KAZMANN, supra note 3, at 129-210. The essential concept here
is that a geological formation, to be classed as an aquifer, must contain water in its in-
terstices and must be capable of yielding that water to wells. Id. at 137
16. Id. at 139.
17 Foley, supra note 11, at 496.
18. F MALONEY, S. PLAGER & F BALDWIN, WATER LAW AND ADMINISTRATION: THE
FLORIDA EXPERIENCE § 51.2, at 141-42 (1968); R. KAZMANN, supra note 3, at 3-5; see also
Meinzer, Outline of Ground- Water Hydrology, in UNITED STATES GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, DEP'T
OF THE INTERIOR WATER-SUPPLY PAPER 494 (1923).
19. McGuinness, The Water Situation in the United States with Special Reference to
Ground Water in DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, GEOLOGICAL SURVEY CIRCULAR 114, at 3, 6 (June
1951).
20. Foley, supra note 11, at 497 ("[Olne cannot separate ground water and surface
water. What is surface water at one time is ground water the next. What is ground water
today becomes surface water tomorrow. Any concept dealing with all water must correlate
ground water and surface water."); E. MALONEY, S. PLAGER & F BALDWIN, supra note
18, § 53.1, at 150-51; Lukas, supra note 5, at 462.
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artificial distinctions.2 ' This early lack of knowledge is illustrated by an
excerpt from the Ohio Supreme Court's opinion in Frazier v Brown.22
Because the existence, origin, movement and course of such waters,
and the causes which govern and direct their movements, are so
secret, occult and concealed, an attempt to administer any
set of legal rules in respect to them would be involved in hopeless
uncertainty, and would be, therefore, practically impossible.23
Such statements are no longer scientifically or legally warranted.2" Despite
this fact, however, the legal treatment of water resources often follows
Frazier v Brown's fictional division of water into four legal classes:
1. [S]urface streams which flow in a permanent, distinct
and well-defined channel from the lands of one owner to those
of another.
2. [Slurface waters-however originating-which, without
any distinct or well-defined channel, by attraction, gravitation or
otherwise, are shed and pass from the lands of one proprietor
to those of another
3. Subterranean streams which flow in a permanent, distinct
and well-defined channel from the lands of one to those of another
proprietor.
4. Subsurface waters which, without any permanent, distinct
or definite channel, percolate in mere veins, ooze, or filter from
the lands of one owner to the lands of another 23
The problem with this legal framework is that it ignores the essential
hydrologic unity of all water Today, the interrelationship between two
wells or between a well and a stream can be shown, "and when causality
is established, liability can be fairly adjudicated. Thus, a modern ground
water doctrine based on hydrological principles can protect a landowner""
and other users from the harm caused by overuse of ground water
resources, while protecting and conserving the ground water resources
themselves.
21. F MALONEY, S. PLAGER & F BALDWIN, supra note 18, § 53.1, at 150. The hydrologic
cycle has been recognized, however, since biblical times. "All the rivers run into the sea;
yet the sea is not full. Unto the place from whence the rivers come, thither they return
again." Ecclesiastes 1.7 (King James).
22. 12 Ohio St. (Critchfield) 294 (1861).
23. Id. at 311.
24. See generally R. KAZMANN, supra note 3, at 129-210; OFFICE OF PUBLIC WORKS,
LA. DEP'T OF TRANSP & DEv., WATER REQUIREMENTS AND AVAILABILITY FOR LOUISIANA,
1980-2020 (1982).
25. 12 Ohio St. (Critchfield) at 298-99.
26. Lukas, supra note 5, at 462. A successful showing of interconnection and harm
will not help a Louisiana plaintiff. See infra text accompanying notes 35-38.
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Louisiana Ground Water Resources: Present Problems and
Future Pressures
Louisiana, even in flood-free years, is a water-rich state. Its mean
annual rainfall of approximately fifty-six inches is nearly twice the national
average.2 7 Louisiana possesses 1.9 million acres of inland surface water
.and ranks fourth in the nation in total surface water area.2" Louisiana's
water problems more frequently involve surplus than scarcity
However, as one commentator observed nearly thirty years ago, "[t]he
law of water rights is destined to increase in importance in this state
because of the drought conditions which have prevailed in northern Loui-
siana during the past few years." 29 Recent years have seen recurrence of
such droughts,3" and water shortages in neighboring states may directly
affect Louisiana's water supply 11
The increasing demand for ground water will be accompanied by in-
creased competition for the resource and an attendant rise in litigation,
and, as recently noted by the Office of Public Works of the Louisiana
Department of Transportation and Development, " [lI]aws on ground
water particularly need attention." 32 The type of thinking that led to this
situation was described some years ago by a Louisiana hydrologist:
27 M. BORTON & H. ELLIS, SOME LEGAL ASPECTS OF WATER USE IN LOUISIANA 5 (1960).
28. LA. STATE SOn. & WATER CONSERVATION Comm., LOUISIANA'S NATURAL RESOURCES-
A CONSERVATION PLAN FOR THE FUTURE 5 (La. Dep't of Transp. & Dev n.d.).
29. Comment, Acquisition of the Right to Use Water 29 TUL. L. REV 554, 563 (1955).
30. Louisiana Water Supply-Projections vs. Availability, Water Currents, Apr. 1983,
at I (Water Resources Study Comm'n, La. Dep't of Transp. & Dev.) ("As recently as last
summer, drought situations have occurred in central Louisiana, where agricultural interests
were competing for water."). For a popular account of contemporary water problems, some
of which could affect Louisiana, see War Over Water-Crisis of the '80s, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Oct. 31, 1983, at 57
31. See generally R. KAZMANN & 0. ARGUELLO, THE MIssIssIPPI RIVER-A WATER
SOURCE FOR TExAs?, LA. WATER RESOURCES RESEARCH INST. BULL. 9 (Mar. 1973). The
and High Plains of Texas have long been using water from the Ogallala Aquifer at a rate
faster than natural recharge. J. KLEBBA, WATER RESOURCES LEGISLATION FOR LOUISIANA,
OFFICE OF PUBLIC WORKS, LA. DEP'T OF TRANSP & DEV 66 (1983). Texas proposed in
"The Texas Water Plan" to divert huge amounts of "surplus" water from the Louisiana
portion of the Mississippi River and export it to the High Plains. R. KAZMANN & 0.
ARGUELLO, supra, at 2-1. This plan obviously would have a profound effect upon Loui-
siana, particularly when one considers that Louisiana projects, such as fresh water diversion
to rebuild eroding coastal marshes, will also require Mississippi River water. For a discus-
sion of how the Texas Water Plan could be forced upon Louisiana by the United States
Congress under the Commerce Clause, see J. KLEBBA, supra, at 68-71. See also Sporhase
v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982) (indicating that ground water is an article
of commerce and therefore subject to regulation under the Commerce Clause).
32. OFFICE OF PUBLIC WORKS, DEP'T OF TRANSP & DEV., LOUISIANA PRIORITIES FOR
THE FUTURE-WATER RESOURCES SYMPOSIUM, FINAL REPORT I (May 14, 1983).
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We find that there is one tacit assumption invariably made con-
cerning water- Water is assumed to be a renewable, naturally
replenished resource that will be available in perpetuity, like the
overlying land. This in addition to its life-giving qualities, makes
water a special case in the field of natural resources. [T]his
assumption is rarely if ever completely true and it may be almost
completely false. The discrepancy between the assumption and the
physical fact has been the cause of great dissatisfaction with cer-
tain legal doctrines. 3
Louisiana's law is based upon the false premise of perpetual availability,
but it refuses to acknowledge that ground water is "a special case in the
field of natural resources." '3 4 The problems inherent in a legal scheme
that insists upon ignoring what is known about water resources in favor
of archaic assumptions may best be illustrated by examining the treat-
ment given a ground water rights dispute by a Louisiana court of appeal.
Adams v Grigsby- A Case and an Analogy
Louisiana jurisprudence contains only one decision dealing with the
rights of adjoining landowners in a common aquifer: Adams v. Grigsby "
In Adams, a Caddo Parish subdivision had obtained fresh water for
domestic use by drilling wells 100 to 200 feet into water-bearing sands
of the Wilcox formation. Grigsby, an oil operator, pumped more than
100,000 gallons per day of ground water from the same formation for
over a year.36 Grigsby used the water for secondary mineral recovery; he
began his operation after the plaintiffs had begun to use the formation
for their water supply The plaintiffs alleged that the activities of the defen-
dant had damaged the aquifer They sought damages for the expensive
modifications to pumps, wells, and piping made necessary by defendant's
activity; the plaintiffs also alleged that their property values dropped. The
district court dismissed the complaint, and the plaintiffs appealed.
The second circuit held that water is a fugitive mineral and is subject
to the rule that a landowner does not own fugitive subsurface minerals
in place.37 Ownership of such minerals can be acquired only by reducing
them to possession, and a landowner or other possessor of a right to
explore for and produce fugitive minerals cannot be limited as to the quan-
tity taken. Thus, Grigsby had the right to pump as much water as his
activities required. The trial court's dismissal of the complaint was
33. R. KAZMANN, supra note 3, at 200.
34. Id.
35. 152 So. 2d 619 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ refused, 244 La. 662, 153 So. 2d 880 (1963).
36. Grigsby's water consumption was described in "barrels" in the opinion. Each barrel
is assumed to be the equivalent of 55 gallons.
37 152 So. 2d at 623.
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affirmed, and the Louisiana Supreme Court, when it denied writs, stated
that the "judgment is correct." 38
At the time it was decided in 1963, Adams must have seemed an
unremarkable case. In the twenty years since its disposition, no case like
it has been decided in Louisiana,39 yet Adams is often referred to as a
leading case. The rule of capture applies to ground water, ' ° and "[i]f
you can pump it you can have it."
'
"4
Adams's application of the rule of capture to ground water was based
upon an analogy between subterranean oil and gas and ground water
The oil-water analogy acknowledged in Adams is traceable to an old legal
fiction accepted by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Rives v Gulf Refin-
ing Co."2
Water and oil and still more strongly gas, may be classed
by themselves, if the analogy be not too fanciful, as minerals ferae
naturae. In common with animals, and unlike other minerals, they
have the power and tendency to escape without the volition of
the owner They belong to the owner of the land, and are
a part of it, and are subject to his control; but when they escape,
and go into other land, or come under another's control, the title
of the former owner is gone."
This classification of ground water as a fugitive mineral was reinforced
in Higgins Oil & Fuel Co. v Guaranty Oil Co." "The analogy between
the subterranean oil and subterranean or percolating waters is, we believe,
near complete '"4 Ultimately, it was this oil-water analogy that led
the court in Adams to conclude that a rule called "absolute ownership"
should control the nature and extent of the parties' property interest in
the ground water "
Adams v Grigsby: What Rule, What Basis?
The first step in a critical examination of the Adams rule must be
38. 244 La. 662, 153 So. 2d 880 (1963).
39. Cases not unlike Adams have arisen in numerous states. See, e.g., cases cited infra
note 69.
40. LA. MIN. CODE: LA. R.S. 31:8 & comment (1975) [hereinafter cited as LA. MIN.
CODE].
41. Louisiana's Ground Water Rights, Water Currents, June 1983, at I (Water Resources
Study Comm'n, La. Dep't of Transp. & Dev.).
42. 133 La. 178, 62 So. 623 (1913).
43. 133 La. at 183, 62 So. at 625. The Rives court quoted language from an unnamed
Pennsylvania Supreme Court case. This case turned out to be Westmoreland & Cambria
Natural Gas Co. v. DeWitt, 130 Pa. 235, 249, 18 A. 724, 725 (1889).
44. 145 La. 233, 82 So. 206 (1919).
45. 145 La. at 246, 82 So. at 211.
46. Grigsby's ownership, said the court, was "unrestricted and unregulated." 152 So.
2d at 624.
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a determination of whether any Louisiana authority then existed for the
application of what is, with respect to its origins in water law, a common
law rule. The principle that land ownership rights extend far above and
below the land surface, or ad coelum, forms the core of the absolute
ownership doctrine or "English Rule."" 7 Louisiana Civil Code article 490
expresses the ad coelum concept: "Unless otherwise provided by law, the
ownership of a tract of land carries with it the ownership of everything
that is directly above or under it." This concept has been a part of Loui-
siana's civil law since 1808;" thus, a substantial basis for absolute owner-
ship existed in the Civil Code when Adams was decided. The Adams deci-
sion did not mention article 490, but Professor Yiannopoulos has cited
Adams as authority for the proposition that "an owner cannot be debar-
red from the legitimate use of his property simply because it may cause
a real damage to his neighbor It would be contrary to the fundamental
legal principle according to which the exercise of a right cannot constitute
a fault or wrong -9
The operation of the ad coelum principle is tempered in the Civil
Code by the sic utere doctrine, which limits the right of a landowner by
not allowing him to harm his neighbors as a result of the use of his land.
The sic utere principle is expressed in Civil Code article 667" "Although
a proprietor may do with his estate whatever he pleases, still he cannot
make any work on it, which may deprive his neighbor of the liberty of
enjoying his own, or which may be the cause of any damage to him."
Article 667 would seem applicable to a dispute such as occurred in Adams.
Nevertheless, the plaintiffs' sic utere argument was rejected by the Adams
court, which was probably influenced by the traditional limits of the sic
utere doctnne." The court also stated that a grant of relief would "in-
evitably involve our courts in a long, unauthorized and complicated series
of judicial regulations.""
Despite these assertions, however, the Adams court expressed
dissatisfaction with the law it felt constrained to apply The court termed
47 The "English Rule" or "rule of capture" as well as the concept of absolute ownership
was first introduced in the English decision, Acton v Blundell, 12 M. & W 324, 67 Rev.
Rep. 361 (Ex. 1843). See Lukas, supra note 5, at 469.
48. Article 490 was formerly article 505 which read in pertinent part: "The ownership
of the soil carries with it the ownership of all that is directly above and under it." 1972
COmPLED EDiTION OF TlE CIVIL CODES OF LoUISLNA art. 505 (J. Dainow ed. 1973) [hereinafter
cited as 1972 COMPILED EDITION]. Article 497 of the Civil Code of 1825 was very similar
to former article 505, and the ad coelum principle was present in article 9 of title II of
book II of the Civil Code of 1808 as well as article 552 of the Code Napoleon of 1804. Id.
49. Higgins Oil & Fuel Co. v Guaranty Oil Co., 145 La. 233, 236, 82 So. 2d 206,
207 (1919), quoted in Yiannopoulos, Violations of the Obligations of Vicinage: Remedies
Under Articles 667 and 669, 34 LA. L. REV 475, 479 (1974).
50. Yiannopoulos, supra note 49, 479-80.




the reasonable use rule the "more modern and popular rule, '" ' and one
commentator has observed that the court "practically invited" legislative
action in the ground water area. "3 The court wisely noted: "We are not
unaware of the growing value and importance of water as a natural
resource and are cognizant of the fact that, in some instances, it is more
valuable and necessary than oil or gas."
'5 4
Notwithstanding the expressions of doubt in Adams, the oil-water
analogy and the absolute ownership (rule of capture) pnnciples were later
codified in the Louisiana Mineral Code." The term "mineral rights," as
used in the Mineral Code, includes water rights,56 and article 4 of the
Mineral Code gives a landowner the right to explore for and mine or
remove "from land the soil itself, gravel, shells, subterranean water, or
other substances occurring naturally in or as a part of the soil or geological
formations on or underlying the land."'" Liquid or gaseous subterranean
minerals are not owned in place, but the landowner has the exclusive right
to develop his property for such minerals and to reduce them to posses-
sion and ownership." Thus, had the Mineral Code been in force when
Adams was decided, the result would not have differed. No search for
a rule would have been necessary; the Mineral Code provides ample
authority for the denial of recovery to the Adams-type plaintiff.
The theory of absolute ownership is consistent with existing codal
norms. The Mineral Code's approach to ground water is identical to its
regime for all fugacious minerals; its present application to ground water,
however, is a serious error None of the highly developed and constitu-
tionally tested mechamsms for the regulation of oil and gas-mechanisms
that operate as restraints on the rule of capture-apply to ground water 19
52. 152 So. 2d at 623.
53. J. KLEBBA, supra note 31, at 20.
54. 152 So. 2d at 624.
55. LA. MIN. CODE art. 8 (1975).
56. McCollam, A Primer for the Practice of Mineral Law Under the New Louisiana
Mineral Code, 50 TUL. L. REv 732, 733 n.5 (1976).
57 Emphasis added.
58. The comment to article 6 of the Mineral Code states: "Article 6 is a retention
of the theory articulated in Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v Salling's Heirs, 150 La. 756,
91 So. 207 (1922)." And article 8 of the Mineral Code contains language plainly rooted
in the ad coelum concept and reminiscent of absolute ownership:
A landowner may use and enjoy his property in the most unlimited manner
for the purpose of discovering and producing minerals, provided it is not pro-
hibited by law. He may reduce to possession and ownership all of the minerals
occurring naturally in a liquid or gaseous state that can be obtained by opera-
tions on or beneath his land even though his operations may cause their migra-
tion from beneath the land of another
Emphasis added.
59. See LA. R.S. 30:1-63 (1975 & Supp. 1984) (duties of the Department of Conserva-
tion and its commissioner).
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Absent such modifications and controls, the Mineral Code, like the ab-
solute ownership doctnne, encourages unbridled use of ground water and,
in turn, depletion of aquifers.
Ad Coelum Realism
Absolute ownership as a rule of water law is a near-literal applica-
tion of the ad coelum doctrine. Even so, absolute ownership is deceptive-
ly named:
It is a misnomer to call the English rule the absolute owner-
ship doctrine. Since a landowner has no rights against an adjoin-
ing landowner who withdraws all of the water under his land and
dries up his wells, it is inaccurate to say that he owns the per-
colating water under his land. Actually, under the English rule,
the landowner does not "own" the percolating water until he has
reduced it to actual possession.6 0
Consistently, the Mineral Code vests actual ownership of fugacious
minerals in a landowner once he captures them.' Ground water cannot
be divided into discrete parcels until captured and therefore is unowned
until capture. This means that someone may be pumping vast amounts
of ground water, but in theory he owns none of the resource while it
is still in the ground. Once the water is captured and out of the ground,
a fundamental shift in classification occurs; water is at that point a private
thing and the law simply ignores the earlier-recognized lack of owner-
ship. The effect of unlimited right to capture, then, is defacto ownership
of water still in place. This is the essence of the underdevelopment of
our ground water law The classification shift eradicates the public in-
terest in ground water, and in the final analysis, betrays pnvate users
by encouraging them to destroy the resource.
Neither the ad coelum doctrine nor the rule of capture which derives
from it, as expressions of a person's property interests in land, need be
so literally applied. Limits upon ad coelum have always been present in
our law The precursors of Civil Code article 490 all limited landowner
rights by means of "the laws and regulations of the police,'"' and the
current version of article 490 not only begins by qualifying a landowner's
rights immediately ("Unless otherwise provided by law") but also ends
with a limitation ("unless he is restrained by law or the rights of others").
The doctrine was designed to-define and fix ownership interests and has
yielded to practical considerations such as those involved with overflight
of aircraft. 61 In fact, the rule of capture, which is very similar to the
ad coelum doctrine, is applied with far less rigidity with respect to oil
60. F MALONEY, S. PLAGER & F BALDWIN, supra note 18, at 155.
61. LA. MIN. CODE art. 6 (1975).
62. 1972 COMPILED EDITION art. 505.
63. United States v Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 260-61 (1946).
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and gas than it, is with respect to ground water, since the extraction of
oil and gas is highly regulated by the state.
4
Major Ground Water Legal Systems
Absolute ownership is just one of five distinct approaches to ground
water rights found among American jurisdictions. The five approaches
are known as absolute ownership, reasonable use, correlative rights, the
Restatement (Second) of Torts rule, and prior appropriation.65 Each is
the product of jurisprudential development," and each of these approaches
will briefly be discussed and evaluated.
Absolute Ownership
Absolute ownership or the English Rule" is the current Louisiana
rule. 8 Absolute ownership was initially applied in twenty-eight American
jurisdictions," but it has "been criticized by writers and repudiated by
most American jurisdictions."7 The rule gives a landowner absolute access
to water underlying his land; he possesses the exclusive right to drill a
well and, absent intentional harm to neighbors or waste, he can pump
as much water, as he is able."
Reasonable Use
The reasonable use approach was the first modification of the ab-
solute ownership doctrine; it is also known as the American Rule.
Reasonable use, which is followed in the majority of eastern junsdictions,"
limits a landowner's use to beneficial uses having a reasonable relation-
ship to the use of his overlying, land. ' Beneficial uses are those possess-
64. See supra note 59.
65. Lukas, supra note 5, at 467
66. Discussion of tiese doctrines is necessarily brief. Exhaustive coverage of them is
abundant. See, e.g., R. CLARK,'S. CIRIACY-WANTRUP W HUTCHINS, C. MARTZ, S. SATO
& A. STONE, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS (1967) [hereinafter cited as WATER RIGHTS]; F
MALONEY, S. PLAGER & F BALDWIN, supra'note 18, §!54, at 153-60; F TRELEASE, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON WATER LAW (3d ed. 1979).
67 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
68: See LA. MIN; CODE arts. 8, 10,(975);'Adams v Grigsby, 152 So. 2d 619 (La.
App. 2d Cir.), writ refused, 244 La. 662, 153 So. 2d 880 (1963).
69. F MALONEY, S. PLAGER & F BALDWIN, supra note 18, § 54.2(a)i at 155; see, e.g.,
Roath v. Driscoll, 20 Conn. 533 (1850); Greenleaf v. Francis, 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 117 (1836);
Frazier v.'Brown, 12 Ohio St. 294 '(1861); Rose-v Socony-Vacuum Corp., 54 R.I. 411,
173 A. 627 (1934); Houston & Tex. Cent. R.R. v. East, 98 Tex. 146, 81 S.W 279 (1904);
Chatfield v Wilson, 28 Vt. 49 (1855).
70. Lukas, supra note 5, at 469 (citing R. POWELL, 5 REAL PROPERTY § 725, at 419
(1981)).
71. 1 WATER RIGHTS, supra note 66, § 17.1, at 71; Lukas, supra note 5, at 469.
72. Lukas, supra note 5, at 468-69.
73. F MALONEY, S. PLAGER & F BALDWIN, supra note 18, §§ 54.2-56, at 155-66; J.
KLEBBA, supra note 31, at 15-17" see also Jones v. Oz-Ark-Val Poultry Co., 228 Ark. 76,
306 S.W.2d 111 (1957).
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ing some commonsense link to economic or domestic activities.14
The reasonable use approach does not analyze particular interferences
or conflicts between ground water users for reasonableness. Instead, par-
ticular water uses are characterized as reasonable or unreasonable per se.7
Use of ground water upon overlying land for agricultural, domestic,
mining, or manufacturing purposes is reasonable under this rule, even
if neighbors' supplies are interfered with.76
This rule has been described as "essentially the rule of absolute owner-
ship with exceptions for wasteful and off-site use.""7 In time, reasonable
uses tend to become synonymous with ordinary uses, undermining the
mild restraint of the doctrine. 8 Like absolute ownership, reasonable use
does not acknowledge the common pool aspects of ground water, and
it will not protect ground water resources from depletion.79
Correlative Rights
The doctrine of correlative rights in water law is "an outgrowth of
the reasonable use rule."80 The features of the doctrine are well illustrated
by the leading correlative rights case, Katz v Walkinshaw,8' which in-
volved a dispute between agricultural users and a city water supplier
Two of the propositions established in Katz form the basis of the
correlative rights doctrine. Under the first, a water transporter "can pro-
tect its right against wasteful or malicious pumping by local users and
against interference by other transporters." 2 Prior to Katz, transporters
lacked any rights vis a vis local users 3 and could pump ground water
only until their use interfered with that of local users." ' Under the second
proposition established in Katz, disputes between local users during times
of insufficient supply would be settled by the court by allowing each "a
fair and just proportion" of the available water 85
74. 1 WATER RIGHTS, supra note 66, § 54.1, at 367-68.
75. Id. § 54.3, at 370-76; Lukas, supra note 5, at 484.
76. F MALONEY, S. PLAGER & F BALDWIN, supra note 18, § 54.2(b)(2), at 156; J.
KLEBBA, supra note 31, at 17
77 Lukas, supra note 5, at 484.
78. Piper & Thomas, Hydrology and Water Law: What is their Future Common
Ground? in WATER RESOURCES AND THE LAW 7 8 (1958).
79. Lukas, supra note 5, at 484-86.
80. J. KLERBA, supra note 31, at 17 Some confusion between correlative rights and
reasonable use has occurred over the years; for a discussion and clarification, see Note,
Water Law-Groundwater Rights in Missouri-A Need for Clarification, 37 Mo. L. REv
357 (1972).
81. 141 Cal. 116, 74 P 766 (1903).
82. Lukas, supra note 5, at 487-88.
83. Id. at 483 n.262.
84. Id. at 487.
85. 141 Cal. at 136, 74 P at 772. This standard applies only between landowners who
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Furthermore, the correlative rights doctrine distinguishes between local
users and transporters, favoring the former "6 Thus, unlike reasonable use
and absolute ownership, the correlative rights doctrine does not recognize
an absolute right of access to ground water coupled with a normally
unlimited right to pump-it asserts that the power to allocate water
resources resides in the courts. Owners of overlying land and non owners
or transporters have co equal or correlative rights in the reasonable,
beneficial use of ground water 11
The most important distinguishing feature of the correlative rights
doctrine, however, is its recognition that adjoining lands may be underlain
by a common, shared aquifer Since the correlative rights doctrine
acknowledges this phenomenon, 9 the judicial power to allocate water per-
mits protection of both the public's interest in the resource itself and the
interests of private users.
Restatement (Second) of Torts Approach
Section 858 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts contains an approach
to water law derived from the correlative rights doctrine.9" This scheme
does not favor local users over transporters, but it does recognize co equal
rights in neighbors who share in a common ground water pool. The cor-
relative rights basis of this approach is particularized in two of the sec-
tion's tests for liability for interference with the use of ground water by
another- (1) a relatively general analysis of reasonableness of withdrawals
based upon the the size of the parties' withdrawals and the total amount
of supply,9 ' and (2) a more specific multifactor test for situations when
use ground water on their own land.
86. Lukas, supra note 5, at 486.
87 Id. at 490.
88. F MALONEY, S. PLAOER & F BALDWIN, supra note 18, § 54.2(b)(3), at 156-57.
Lukas, supra note 5, at 486.
89. See Wiel, Natural Communism: Air Water Oil, Sea, and Seashore, 47 HARv L.
REv 425 (1934).
90. Lukas, supra note 5, at 493. Section 858(i) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
reads:
(1) A proprietor of land or his grantee who withdraws ground water from the
land and uses it for a beneficial purpose is not subject to liability for interference
with the use of water by another, unless:
(a) the withdrawal of ground water unreasonably causes harm to a proprietor
of neighboring land through lowering the water table or reducing artesian pressure,
(b) the withdrawal of ground water exceeds the proprietors' reasonable share
of the annual supply or total store of ground water, or
(c) the withdrawal of the ground water has a direct and substantial effect upon
a watercourse or lake and unreasonably causes harm to a person entitled to the
use of its water.
91. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 858(1)(a) & comments c, e, f (1977); Lukas,
supra note 5, at 495.
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a use -is not disproportionately large relative to existing uses but, still'affects
other users. 2
Wisconsin, in State v Michels Pipeline Constru'ho 3"was the first,
and' thus far the only, state to adopt this rule. In Michels Pipeline, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court reconsidered its long"Standing recognition of
absolute ownership principles. After a thorough examination of absolute
ownership the court overruled its endorsement of that doctrine9 and
adopted the Restatement (Second) rule as a "rule of law more in har-
mony with present scientific and legal principles." 95
Some commentators' believe that the Restatement's, scheme retains the
basic rationality, of correlative rights but also provides a more objective
standard of reasonableness." ' Other commentators, however, have criticized
its relative uncertainty as to liability and have labeled the multifactor tesi
as "nebulous."'"
Doctrine of Prior Appropriation
The doctrinie of prior appropriation developed in response to the sur-
face water requirements of nineteenth century California gold miners, and
it'has leen extended to ground water 91 This approach to water rights
92. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 858(1)(b), (2) & comments c, d, g (1977); see
also id., ,§. 850A. Factors listed in section 850A ,are:
(a) The purpose of the use,-,,.
(b) the suitability of the use t6 the watercourse or lake,
(c) the' economic value of the'use,
(d) the social value of the use,
(e) the extent and amount of the harm it causes,
(f) the practicality of avoiding the harm by adjusting the use or.method of use
of one proprietor or the other,
(g) the practicality of adjusting the quantity of water used by each proprietor,
(h) the protection of existing values -of water uses, land, investments -and enter-
prises, and
.(i), the justice of requiring the user causing harm to bear the,.loss.
93. 63 Wis. 2d 278, 217 N.W.2d 339 (1974).
94.,. The court overruled its longstanding, decision in Huber v: Merkel, 117 Wis. 355,
94 N.W 354 (1903), which had held that a person injured by interference with ground
water underlying his -land -had.no,cause of action.
95. 63 Wis. 2d at 298, 217 N.W.2d at 348.
96. Lukas, supra note 5, at 499.
97 See Lowe, Ruedisili & Graham, Beyond Section 858: A, Proposed Ground-water
Liability and-Management System for the Eastern United States, 8 EcOLOGYL.Q:! 131 (1979).
The authors write: "Section,858 misses the fundamental issue of a ground-water dispute
in stating that because ground water is generally abundant, both parties have rights; it is
because ground-water supplies are not abundant that such.disputes arise." Id. at 141. This
statement may or may not be correct,. but the criticism is consistent, in part;. with that
of Dr. Kazmann.
98. Busby, American Water Rights Law: A, Brief Synopsis of its Origin and Some of




is :characteristic of the arid western jurisdictions.99 Under the:doctrine of
prior appropriation, a priority of right is obtained by the first actual- user
of a particular ground water source.10 Most states using this doctrine
have administrative permit systems, but even among those which do not,
priority is fixed by the first, substantial act Which leads to diversion and
use."' - Thus, reasonable diligence in putting water touse is expected.
The.prior, appropriation doctrineis similar to, the ground water law
approaches that are -centered around land ownership i.- that an ap-
proprlative water right is a right of. use or access and is not. an interest
in the actual corpus of the water supply.;!,_.However, the doctrine differs
from the land ownership-centered.approaches previously discussed in.one
very important respect-appropnative rights do not depend upon land
ownership,' 3 and they need not be exercised on the overlying land.," ' Ab-
sent utilization of the supply, such rights do not exist.
Under the prior appropriation rule, the use ofwatermust bebeneficial
in order for the user to acquire appropriative rights.!" Theoretically, such
a requirement prevents wasteful use of:a, scarce.resource, but the beneficial
use requirement, without, more, may allow a user to totally deplete a water
source as long as he does so in a purportedly beneficial manner The
prior appropriation doctrine, however, has modified the beneficial use con-
cept to include the interests of the public in maintaining water supplies
or to include a requirement of reasonableness with respect to other private
users'.
The Shape of a Sblutt6n
A judicial "better.rule",is not a practical, legally sufficient, or. com-
prehensive answer to Louisiana's future ground water allocation problems.
Because the rule of capture has .beenadopted by the Mineral Code, no
Louisiana court is likely to overrule it. Even if this were not the case,
however, several connected factors militate against. judicial solutions in
this area. The role of courts is limited to the solution of individual private
disputes, the resolution of which is necessarily piecemeal.' 6 In addition,
protection- of the public interest in natural resources is a modern necessity,
99' 1 WATER RIGHTS, § 15.1, at 61. in 1976, Mississippi adopted the prior appropria-
tion doctrine for its ground water resources. MISS. CODE ANN. § 51-4-1 to 51-4-19 (Supp.
1983).
100. 1 WATER RIGHTS, § 51.6, at 295-96.
101. Id. § 51.6, at 295-96 (1967); § 51.6, at 85 n.67, (Supp. 1978).
102. Id. § 51.9, at 299.
103. Id. § 51.6, at 296.
104. Id.
105. Id. § 54.1, at 368; see also, Wiel, What Is. Beneficial -Use of Water?, 3 CALIF
L. REV 460 (1915).
106. Rossmann &,Steel, Forging the New Water Law. Public Regulation of "Proprietary"
Groundwater Rights, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 903, 904 & n.4 (1982).
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and the courts, saddled with the constraints imposed by the Mineral Code,
which recognizes no public interest in ground water,' 7 cannot provide
such protection.
California has had a long history of water shortages, water disputes,
and litigation over water rights.' 8 In Meridian, Ltd. v City & County
of San Francisco,"9 the California Supreme Court expressed its dissatisfac-
tion with judicial resolutions: "[tihe judgement is necessarily confined to
the issues presented by the parties to this action. This method of resolv-
ing controversies involving the rights of the users is necessarily
piecemeal, unduly expensive, and obviously unsatisfactory ""I These sen-
timents were reiterated by that court in In re Waters of Long Valley Creek
Stream System. " 't
[A] context in which water rights are deternuned through
piecemeal adjudication will settle disputes among only a small
number of those persons who claim a right to the use of water
The judgement in this type of adjudication necessarily can
bind only those who are parties to the litigation
[Tihere is a limitation inherent in the ability of private
lawsuits to provide clarity, certainty, and security to water rights
and water users."'
The requirements for a comprehensive modern system are a second
reason why legislative action is the preferable answer to ground water
problems. Some of these requisites, as listed by the California Supreme
Court in In re Waters of Long Valley Creek, are clarity, certainty, and
security of water rights.'" A legal system must accommodate differing
parties whose various interests will cause them to define each requirement
differently Professor Trelease has provided a "water law professor's
credo" as a broad overview of a ground water regulatory scheme, a view
which emphasizes private property rights and which supports public regula-
tion "only when private economic action does not protect the public
interests.""" A writer who has extensively surveyed the legal literature
107 Adams v. Grigsby is cited in the comment to article 8 of the Mineral Code in
the context of the definition of the rights of landowners. Nowhere in the Adams opinion
is a public interest in the resource acknowledged.
108. The volume of litigation and commentary dealing with California water law is truly
impressive. See, e.g., Hutchins, California Ground Water: Legal Problems, 45 CALIF L.
REV 688 (1957).
109. 13 Cal. 2d 424, 90 P.2d 537 (1939).
110. 13 Cal. 2d at 457 90 P.2d at 553.
111. 25 Cal. 3d 339, 599 P.2d 656, 158 Cal. Rptr 350 (1979).
112. 25 Cal. 3d at 347 599 P.2d at 660-61, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 354.
113. 25 Cal. 3d at 354-57 599 P.2d at 663-67, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 357-61.
114. Trelease, Policies for Water Law: Property Rights, Economic Forces, and Public
Regulation, 5 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1, 2 (1965). Professor Trelease wrote that an "oversimplified
statement" might say something like this:
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on groundwater stated that five criteria most commonly are used to
evaluate judicial rules,'" while another such survey provided thirteen
"useful factors" for analysis of water law systems (including legislative
solutions as well).1 '6 All of these particularized criteria may be distilled
into three basic elements: (1) ground water is a resource possessed of a
public interest; (2) good law will protect ground water users from each
other, and (3) good law will protect the resource itself and will maximize
its benefits to users. 1I7
[Wiater law should provide for maximum benefits from the use of the resource,
and this end should be reached by means of granting private property rights in
water, secure enough to encourage development and flexible enough for economic
forces to change them to better uses, and subject to public regulation only when
private econormc action does not protect the public interests.
Id. Professor Milliman has also expressed this basic thesis. See generally Milliman, Water
Law and Private Decision-Making: A Critique, 2 J. L. & EcON. 41 (1959).
115. Lukas, supra note 5, at 460-67 ((1) protection of usufructuary rights, (2) recogni-
tion of hydrologic relationships, (3) encouragement of maximum beneficial use, (4) response
to public needs, and (5) fairness in allocation).
116. Weston and Gang, Law of Ground Water in Pennsylvania, 81 DICK. L. REV I1
(1976). The thirteen factors are phrased as questions in subheadings of the article:
A. Does the Legal System Correspond to Hydrologic Fact?
B. How Well Is the Relative Availability or Scarcity of the Resource Addressed?
C. Is the System Capable of Managing Ground Water as a Renewable Resource?
D. How Does the Legal System Define Allowable Uses?
E. Does the System Control Consumptive Use?
F Is Economic Efficiency Encouraged?
G. Does the System Provide Sufficient Security of Water Rights to Protect Beneficial
Investments?
H. Does the System Allow Flexibility to Meet Changing Water Needs?
L Does the System Allow for Considerations of Distributional Fairness?
J. Does the System Provide for Recharge of Aquifers and Use of Underground
Reservoirs for Artificial Storage?
K. Does the System Allow Pooling of Resource Rights?
L. Are Environmental Values Protected?
M. Is the Legal System Administrable?
Id. at 45-62.
117 Several states have undertaken ambitious legislative programs with the goal of water
law reform. In 1972 Florida adopted the Florida Water Resources Act of 1972 (FWRA),
which was "[d]esigned to provide comprehensive state regulation of Florida's water resources
on a hydrologically sound basis through consideration of the interrelationship of all types
of water resources in the hydrologic cycle." Maloney, Capehart & Hoofman, Florida's
"'Reasonable Beneficial" Water Use Standard. Have East and West Met? 31 U. FLA. L.
REV 253, 253 (1979). See generally F MALONEY, R. AusuEss & J. MORRIS, A MODEL WATER
CODE WITH COMMENTARY (1972). Because Florida, like Louisiana, has abundant water sup-
plies but, unlike Louisiana, has already experienced significant ground water problems (suds
or salt water infiltration of aquifers in the Miami area), this legislative effect should be
well scrutinized by Louisianians concerned with reform of this state's law.
The FWRA provides for a permit program regulating water use, and contains broad
guidelines for establishment of that program. FLA. STAT. ANN-J. §§ 373.203-.249 (1974 &
Supp. 1983). Final responsibility for the permit program is delegated to five water manage
ment districts, 6 FLA. ADMIN. CODE §§ 16-G, 16-H, 161-2, 16J-2.07-.16, 16k-2.01-.16 (1978).
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Governmental Authority. for Regulation of Ground Water
in Louisiana
The stage is-already'set for adoption of aground watercode in Loui-
siana. Article IX, section 1 of the Louisiana Constituti'n"of 1974 pro-
vides that "[tihe natural resources ofthe state, includingtair and-water
shall be protected, conserved, and replenished insofar 'as possible
and ;consistent with the health, safety, and welfare of the people. The
legislature shall enact laws to implement this policy "'Hbwever, b'cause
this language may be regarded as hortatory or aspirational, rather than
mandatory,'' the presence of article IX, section 1 in the Constitution
may not, without more, mandate reform of Louisiana ground water law
In the oil and gas area, article IX, section 1 has been better follow-
ed. Subterranean oil and gas are; like ground water;' res nullius and a
landownerhas the right to drill for them and to reduce them to posses-
sion and ownership. However, the operation of the rule of capture with
respect to oil and gas -is restricted. Recogmtion that the-,,resource may
occur in pools underlying more than one tract of'land is accompanied
by conservation legislation and unitization techniques which limit a iand-
owners right to drill in exchange for an interest in a nitized production
area and his right to retain production from wells that are present on
his land.'' 9 A state officer, -the Commissioner of Conservation, has broad
regulatory authority 20 A Louisiana ground water code utilizing a similar
scheme would put the entire oil-water analogy to work and would avoid
many of the problems spawned by Adams. This would be preferable to
the present law, but it would also be much more expensive. Water is likely
to remain less valuable as a market item than oil and gas.
Theories as to how the state could, regulate ground water involve.either
a state claim of ownership in the public interest of the resource or the
development of the usufructuary nature of the rule of capture-based.rights
to the corpus of the water itself Under the first concept, ground' water
(similarly to oil and gas) is seen as res nullius in place.' 2 ' This is consis-
Subsection 373.223(t) sets, forthithe conditions that must be met to obtain a permit. The
applicant must show that the .proposed ;water use: "(a) Is a reasonable-beneficial use as
defined in § 373.019(5); and (b) Will not. interfere with any presently existing legal use of
water; and (c) Is consistent with the public interest." Reasonable-beneficial use is defined
as "the use of water in such quantity as is necessary for economic and efficient utilization
for a purpose and in a manner which is both reasonable and consistent with.the public
interest." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373.019(4) (Supp. 1983). It has.been observed that this stan-
dard is functionally very similar to the Restatement (Second) of Torts approach,..and that
the FWRA was intended to use the term "reasonable" in its traditional, "technical sense,
pregnant with common law factors to guide the discretion of administrative 'agencies,""
Maloney, Capehart & Hoofman, supra;, at 256 n.21.
118. Hargrave; "Statutory" and "Hortatory" Provisions of the Louisiana Constitution
of 1974, 43 LA. L. REV 647 689 (1983).
119. LA. MIN. CODE art. 114 (1975). "
120. LA. R.S. 30:4 (1975 & Supp. 1984).
121. Hargrave, Legal Problems in the Development of Geothermal Energy Resources,
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tent with the present, law applicable to oil and .gas. A landowner owns
a right, of capture only and that right. may be limited ori~taken away by
the state."2
This approach is open to a constitutional attack based upon the argu-
ment that the' right to drill'is vested, and'if the state impairs the right,
a -taking 'without due'process will occur '23-Such rights have been'recognized
by the United States Supreme'Court.'34 A reply. to constitutional attack
could analogize state regulation of wildlife resources.. Divestiture, :partial
or total, of the right to take wild animals has been held constitutional;
wild animals have been classified as a fugitive resource just as oil, gas,
and ground water have been. ' In the past, the state actually claimed
title to wildlife, but this view has been replaced by the proposition 'that
wildlife, as res nullius, are owned by the public and managed in a kind
of trust for the public by the state.,2 The strength of state power over
wildlife is due at least in part to a long-term, judicially recognized strong
state interest in animal resources. '27 There, is no such traditional, state in-
terest. in ground water, but contemporary conditions call ;for Louisiana
to declare and establish such an interest..
The second concept has' been the basis for state control of water
resources in other jurisdictions. Laws -which embody it have withstood
constitutional. attack despite their effect of state-imposed divestiture of
drilling rights.' 28 The theory is that "since only vested rights are constitu-
tionally, protected from taking, one has no protection in those rights not
vested, and it. has been concluded that there is no vested, right in
underground water not appropriated and applied to beneficial use. by the
landowner "I29 A landowner is seen to have vested rights only in water
that he has actually appropriated and put to 'beneficial use,, and the state
can appropriate the resource in place for the benefit of the public.. Under
this theory, the opposite of absolute ownership principles obtains: There
is no de facto ownership by the landowner of the aquifer because his
right to extract does not somehow' insulate him from restriction as to how
much he can extract. Yet, the basic tenets of absolute ownersip-
in TWENTY-SIXTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON MINERAL LAW- 224, 227 (1980).
122. Id. at 229-30.
123. Id.. at 230.
124. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (holding that a statute,!which
impaired a landowner's, right to mine underground coal was a taking).
125. Hargrave, supra note 121, at 229.
126. Id.
127 Id. at 230.
128. Id. at 231 & n.13 (citing Baumann v. Smrha, 145 F Supp. 617 (D. Kan.), aff'd,
352 U.S. 863 (1956)).
129. Id. at 230. See Eddy v Simpson, 3 Cal. 249, 252, (1853) ("It is laid down by
our law writers, that the right of property in water is usufructuary and consists not so
much of the fluid itself as the advantage of its use.").
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nonownership of the mineral in place and recognition of the exclusive
right in the landowner to explore for and produce the mineral-are given
true force. Water already put to beneficial use and rights to drill extant
at the time legislation is passed would be protected from divestiture under
this theory 30 This scheme is perfectly consistent with existing Louisiana
law (Mineral Code, Civil Code, and Adams v Grigsby) because the
usufructuary nature of a landowner's right to the water underlying his
property is preserved. This is the conceptual base upon which a Loui-
siana ground water code ought to be constructed.
Proposals for Specific Elements of a Ground Water Code
Louisiana's legal structure appears to contain a niche that will readi-
ly accommodate state regulation of ground water Proof of this may be
found in the existence of statutory law concerning ground water; these
provisions are the remnants of a comprehensive, statewide ground water
bill that died in committee in 1972.'"' This legislation basically does two
things. First, it gives the Office of Public Works of the Department of
Transportation and Development, as an agency, some authority to regulate
ground water 132 This authority, however, does not extend to small wells
such as those owned by the Adams v Grigsby plaintiffs. "
To deal with situations like Adams, at least in one area of the state,
the legislation creates a regional district-the Capital Area Groundwater
Conservation District.'34 The District was established in 1974 and includes
East Baton Rouge, East Feliciana, Point Coupee, West Baton Rouge, and
West Feliciana Parishes.' The District possesses authority to regulate and
restrict ground water use by persons within it, even where the water has
been produced by effort of the landowner 3I The authority clearly is
designed to recognize that one landowner's use of ground water may
materially affect his neighbors' use of it.'
Within the District, the operation of the pure rule of capture
announced in Adams has been severely curtailed. Ground water is never
130. Hargrave, supra note 121, at 230.
131. La. H.R. 440, 35th Reg. Sess. (1972); see J. KLEBBA, supra note 31, at 34-35. The
bill would have given the Office of Public Works of the Department of Transportation
and Development the authority to require permits for the drilling of wells, to restrict pump-
ing during periods of excessive withdrawal or when the quality of the water supply is other-
wise endangered, and to establish water use priorities. Id.
132. LA. R.S. 38:3091-.3094 (Supp. 1984).
133. LA. R.S. 38:3073(5) (Supp. 1984).
134. LA. R.S. 38:3076(A) (Supp. 1984).
135. LA. R.S. 38:3072(A) (Supp. 1984).




expressly described as res nullius, but the board of commissioners of the
district has, for example, the following powers:
(2) To require permits for the drilling or construction of all
wells drilled after July 31, 1974, having a capacity in excess of
fifty thousand gallons per day
(6) To specify spacing of wells upon a showing that the
water quality, quantity of withdrawal or subsidence in such area
threatens the public interest.
(12) To establish groundwater use priorities 138
These powers necessarily recognize that the public has an interest in ground
water The governing body of the District has not yet found it necessary
to exercise any of its more specific powers; thus, no judicial test of its
statutory power to restrict has yet occurred.' 39 The District presently func-
tions primarily as a data gathenng and monitoring entity
It is submitted that the framework set forth in this legislation should
be expanded and amended to form a comprehensive statewide authority
over Louisiana's ground water Authority should not be vested in numerous
small local districts,'" but should instead be placed in an Office of Water
Resources under either the Department of Transportation and Develop-
ment, the Department of Natural Resources, or the Department of
Environmental Affairs.
Such legislation should incorporate the primary conceptual elements
of the Capital Area Groundwater Conservation District. It should: (1)
expressly declare that "[t]he orderly utilization of groundwater resources
is hereby found and declared to be a matter of public interest;"'"' (2)
recognize that the capacity of an aquifer is knowable and that pumpage
is to be apportioned justly and equitably;' 2 (3) give the office of Water
Resources authority to control well spacing "upon a showing" that cur-
rent usage in an area "threatens the public interest";'4 3 (4) provide for
the maximum practicable data collection; (5) incorporate the implied limits
138. LA. R.S. 38:3076(A) (Supp. 1984).
139. J. KLEBBA, supra note 31, at 54.
140. See Johnson, Texas Groundwater Law: A Survey and Some Proposals, 22 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 1017 (1982) (discussing some shortcomings of the district approach). Basical-
ly, statewide districting is a piecemeal approach, permitting "balkanization" of what should
be a uniform, statewide authority over ground water. If regulatory authority is to be locally
delegated, this should be organized into a small number of loose regional districts, as has
been done in Florida. See supra note 117
141. LA. R.S. 38:3071(A) (Supp. 1984).
142. LA. R.S. 38:3073(11) (Supp. 1984).
143. LA. R.S. 38:3076(A)(6) (Supp. 1984).
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of Civil Code article 490 by stating. that ,'[n]o order limiting rates of
production as authorized in Subsectionr.A of this section shall have the
effect of in any way denying to any owner of the land a reasonable
opportunity.to produce and beneficially use his just and equitable share
of the groundwater supply", ,4 and (6) establish administrative procedures
sensitive to constitutional requirements." 5
The major areas of the existing framework which would require-change
if the-scheme were to be applied statewide .involve smallwells and. user
liability Louisiana Revised Statutes 38:3070 exempts small wells from the
control of the governmental authority Small wells and domestic users
may have a relatively small impact upon-the capacity of an aquifer, but
numerous disputes involving small users are likely as the competition for
quality water resources grows. A truly comprehensive regulatory scheme
would minimize the. need for ad hoc judicial determination by regulating
all users of ground water
Cost is the major problem with small,:users.'If the underlying policies
of a ground water code are. to recognize the hydrologic nature of the
resource, beneficially and justly apportion the resource among users, and,
provide a rational means for determimng liability for behavior which
damages the resource or a fellow user, then every user should be aware
of ground water movements below his,land, and of uses which could in-
jure the resource orl his.neighbors. The tests necessary to.determne ground
water movements and injurious use consequences are expensive; a small
or domestic user cannot reasonably be expected to employ them.'" If a
user cannot afford the tests, he cannot justly be held liable, via construc-
tive knowledge, for the damages caused by'his pumping.'" The imposi-
tion of liability under such circumstances would be as absurd as the ab-
solute ownership decisions which "presume that a landowner does not
know ,the results'of such tests when, in fact, he has made them."""48
Two possible solutions are suggested. First, the state could -assume
responsibility for the calculation and dissemination of necessary ground
water data. Again, cost is a problem because testing is expensive. If the
state does the work, however, costs would be distributed through society
and two other advantages would result: the state could more closely
monitor fluctuations or changes in the resource and more effectively
safeguard the public's interest. Incidental to these efforts, it could distribute
its results to local users. Testing accomplished by a single public agency,
a second possible solution; would produce better results than- would
piecemeal efforts by individuals. '
144. LA. R.S. 38:3076(B) (Supp. 1984).
145. LA. R.S. 38:3076, :3078, .3080-:3081 (Supp. 1984).
146. Davis, Wells and Streams: Relationship at Law, 37 Mo. L. REv 189, 236 (1972).
147 Id. at 202.
148. Id. at 235
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An alternative solution could be predicated upon presumptions which
are tailored to the size of the use. Wells that: a reasonable person would
not install without first making hydrologic tests would be defined as high-
capacity wells,"19 and owners of such wells .would, be charged with
knowledge revealed by the tests and -could be liable for unreasonable in-
jurious consequences.' Small wells would be defined as.those which, a
reasonable person would install without expensive, testing. Owners of small
wells would be charged only with knowledge reasonably available to
them."
Tailoring the Scheme to Local Conditions
Louisiana hasan abundance of ground water overall. This does not
mean, however, that the statewide statutory scheme should be insensitive
to local conditions or the interrelationship of different areas of the state.
Different portions of Louisiana possess very, different ground water
resources and use characteristics. A. just and equitable share for a type
A user in Caddo Parish will probably differ from what that share is for
the same type of user in East Feliciana Pansh, and, therefore, a ground
water code must address these considerations. And as one writer has sug-
gested, the most effective means of ad'dressing these concerns in a statewide
regulatory scheme is to divide the state'into "critical" and "noncritical"
areas, with different principles applicable to ground water use in these




Noncritical areas. As the label suggests, noncritical areas would be
portions of Louisiana within which adequate ground water resources exist
for current and projected uses."' Three alternatives are suggested for water
allocation within noncritical areas: the first user principle, the priority
use rule, and the comparative cause rule.
The first user, prnciple "" adopts an element typical of western ground
water appropriation law- an area's first user is entitled to water rights
superior to, those of his neighbors. Advantages of the rule are certainty
and some logical fairness, but it suffers from serious disadvantages. First,
it assumes a scarcity of water, an assumption that would probably not
be valid in .a Louisiana noncritical area. In addition, older uses are not
always more beneficial than or preferable to more recent uses. One fun-
damental premise of a statutory scheme is recognition of the public in-
terest, and that interest is not well served by a relatively rigid rule which
does not scrutinize types of use.
149. Id. at 236
150. Id.
151. Id. at 236-37
152. Lowe, Ruedisili & Graham, supra note 97 at 150.
153. Id. at 150-55.
154. Id. at 151.
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Under the priority use rule,'5 the legislature would establish the rank-
ing of uses. Like the first user pnnciple, a priority use approach provides
certainty at the expense of balance; too much weight is given a single
facet of ground water management. This rule also assumes a basic scarcity
of water, and it is possible that political forces could unduly influence
ranking of uses.'16
In application, a priority use rule could produce problems when
disputes anse. When two users having the same priority clash, the rule
would be of no help, and recourse to a different rule, such as the first
user principle, would be necessary ,' This tends to offset one of the vir-
tues of the priority use rule-simplicity
A third approach to ground water resource allocation in noncritical
areas may be found in the comparative cause rule.' Comparative cause
would hold each ground water user liable only in proportion to his use
during the period of damage.' 9 This principle is derived from the cor-
relative rights doctrine.' 0 It explicitly recognizes that ground water prob-
lems in water-rich areas are frequently temporary and that legal fault is
not always a viable issue in a dispute.'"
The results produced by a comparative cause rule would be fairer
than those obtained under the previous two rules, but they would also
be less certain. It is reasonable to state that in a noncritical area of a
water-rich state, fairness and flexibility should outweigh certainty as
desirable attributes of a ground water law The need the rule creates for
reliable, available ground water data could be a major weakness of the
comparative cause rule. Situations involving multiple parties would be dif-
ficult to solve with such data and nearly impossible to solve without it.
On the whole, the comparative cause approach seems to be the best
of the three alternatives for Louisiana. It is conduct-based, rather than
property-based, and for this reason, it shifts the focus of the law towards
the resource and its management and away from the individual landowner
and his property rights. Furthermore, because comparative cause flows
from correlative rights, it is consistent with certain aspects of land owner-
ship and mineral rights already present in the Civil Code and the Mineral
Code. Comparative cause also contains room for the necessary role of
the public interest in ground water because the common pool nature of
the resource is explicit in the rule.
155. Id. at 152.
156. It should be noted here that the progressive Louisiana water resource legislation
was killed largely by rice-growing interests from southwestern Louisiana. See J. KLEBBA,
supra note 31, at 35 & n.lll, supra note 131 and accompanying text.
157 Lowe, Ruedisili & Graham, supra note 97 at 153.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. See supra notes 80-89 and accompanying text.
161. Lowe, Ruedisili & Graham, supra note 97 at 153.
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Critical areas. An area may be defined as critical if it is chronically
short of water or if its ground water is absolutely depended upon by
numerous users.' 2 A Louisiana ground water code could classify critical
ground water areas by the relative severity of the water situation in each
area, an approach which would provide flexibility Since the underlying
assumption in a critical area is scarcity of water, priorities for a statutory
system would include the ability to recognize and react to potential short-
ages. Uses and sources would require adjustment during shortages, and
administrative action, subject to judicial review, would assure fair and
speedy resolution of such problems.
Of course, cooperation and interplay between noncritical and critical
areas within the state are essential. If a problem occurs in a critical area,
effective transfer of water from the nearest noncritical area would be essen-
tial. Protectionist statutes like those currently in force in two parishes
would have to yield before a uniform statewide ground water code.'6 3
Conclusion
Louisiana is in an enviable position. The state possesses vast water
resources, including abundant supplies of ground water Our ground water
law is undeveloped, however, and will not serve the state well in a future
that, without question, will place severe demands upon the resource.
Much of the framework for an adequate system is already firmly
162. Id. at 150.
163. LA. R.S. 14:224 (1974) states:
A. No person, firm, corporation, public body, quasi-public body or political
subdivision shall transport under ground water or surface water from the parish
of St. Tammany to any person, firm, corporation, municipality or city located
outside of said parish; provided, however, that the provisions of this section shall
not be construed to prohibit any person, firm or corporation engaged in the business
of selling or furnishing to consumers bottled water from wells which are situated
within the said parish.
B. Any violation of this law shall be punishable by a fine of not more than
five thousand dollars or by a jail sentence of not more than six months, and
each day of continued violation shall constitute a separate offense.
LA. R.S. 33:1236.9 (Supp. 1984) states:
A. The governing authority for the parish of Tangipahoa may adopt ordinances
prohibiting any person, firm, corporation, public body, quasi-public body, or
political subdivision from transporting underground or surface water from the
parish of Tangipahoa to any person, firm, corporation, municipality, or city located
outside of said parish; provided, however, that the provisions of this Section shall
not be construed to permit prohibiting any person, firm, or corporation engaged
in the business of selling or furnishing to consumers bottled water from wells
which are situated within said parish from selling or furnishing such bottled water.
B. Any such ordinance may provide penalties for violation thereof, which
penalties may include a fine of not more than five thousand dollars or a jail
sentence of not more than six months, or both. Such ordinance may provide that
each day of continued violation constitutes a separate offense.
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established in Louisiana law An internally consisteit and logically com-
plete expansion of the, oil-water analogy can protect private. rights and
the public interest.
Ground water is truly the most massive of common pools. It is linked
with the rivers, the sea, and the sky The wisdom or lack of wisdom with
which ground water is managed will, in the foreseeable ffuture, directly
affect all Louisianians.
Steven J Levine
